{"id":1104,"date":"2026-06-28T07:05:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-28T07:05:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/?p=1104"},"modified":"2026-06-28T07:05:03","modified_gmt":"2026-06-28T07:05:03","slug":"the-unfinished-war-in-the-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/","title":{"rendered":"The Unfinished War in the East"},"content":{"rendered":"

Gridizer Research<\/strong>
Europe Under Pressure \u2014 Chapter 3 of 5
Research Track: Europe \/ Security \/ Ukraine \/ Russia \/ Industrial Capacity<\/em><\/p>\n

Europe has had to relearn the language of war. It has rebuilt military thinking, reassessed energy dependencies, strengthened support for Ukraine and accepted that force can once again shape political outcomes on the European continent. But learning how to prepare for war is not the same as learning how to end one.<\/p>\n

That distinction is now central. A security policy built only around deterrence may prevent immediate collapse. It may buy time, make aggression more costly and protect weaker states from being forced into immediate concessions. But deterrence alone does not automatically create a stable political order. If it becomes the whole strategy, Europe risks turning a temporary emergency into a permanent system: armed borders, escalating defence budgets, frozen economic relations, hostile energy structures and a continent increasingly organised around the expectation of the next confrontation.<\/p>\n

The question is not whether Europe needs military strength. It clearly does. The question is whether that strength is being built to defend a future peace \u2014 or merely to sustain an indefinite condition of confrontation.<\/p>\n

A continent trapped between two bad futures<\/h2>\n

Europe faces two obvious dangers. The first is premature concession. A settlement that leaves Ukraine weak, insecure and politically abandoned would not produce lasting stability. It would deepen fear in Eastern Europe, weaken confidence in European guarantees and create the impression that military coercion has produced political results. A peace imposed on the weaker side, without credible security arrangements or an enforceable political framework, is unlikely to remain a peace for long.<\/p>\n

The second danger is the opposite: a Europe that accepts permanent mobilisation as its new normal. In this model, the continent remains divided into armed blocs, sanctions become semi-permanent, energy systems remain politicised, industrial investment moves elsewhere and every future diplomatic proposal is judged not by whether it reduces risk, but by whether it sounds sufficiently uncompromising.<\/p>\n

\n

Premature concession \u2192 insecurity \u2192 resentment \u2192 unresolved borders \u2192 future coercion risk. Permanent confrontation \u2192 rising defence costs \u2192 lower investment \u2192 energy insecurity \u2192 political fatigue \u2192 weaker European cohesion.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Europe is therefore not choosing between a good option and a bad one. It is navigating between two dangerous futures. It needs enough strength to prevent coercion today, and enough political imagination to prevent the same war from becoming the organising principle of European life for the next generation.<\/p>\n

That requires rejecting both fatalism and illusion. Russia will not disappear. Ukraine cannot simply be treated as a buffer zone. The United States may remain a crucial ally, but Europe cannot assume that American political priorities will always match European needs. And the economic consequences of permanent strategic confrontation will not remain confined to military budgets. They will affect energy, industry, social spending, public debt, investment and the legitimacy of democratic governments.<\/p>\n

A continent that spends more and more to defend itself while becoming economically weaker and politically more divided has not solved its security problem. It has only changed its form.<\/p>\n

Russia will remain part of Europe\u2019s geography<\/h2>\n

The idea of a future European security order that includes Russia is emotionally difficult for many people. After war, territorial conflict and years of mutual hostility, it can sound na\u00efve or even offensive. But geography does not disappear because diplomacy fails.<\/p>\n

Russia is not a temporary problem at the edge of Europe. It is a nuclear power, a major military actor, a resource state, a neighbour of multiple European countries and a permanent factor in the political geography of the continent. Europe\u2019s strategic question is therefore not whether it should trust Russia blindly. It should not. The question is whether Europe can build a system in which trust is no longer required as the sole foundation of security.<\/p>\n

That is what institutions, verification, arms control, monitored borders, transparency mechanisms and economic incentives are for. The old European order relied too heavily on assumptions. Trade was treated as proof of mutual interest. Energy dependency was treated as stability. Economic interdependence was treated as a substitute for political settlement. Those assumptions failed.<\/p>\n

But the failure of the old order does not mean that Europe\u2019s only alternative is permanent isolation. A future settlement would have to be harder, more sceptical and more structured than the old one. It would not be based on declarations of friendship. It would be based on reducing the capacity and incentive for renewed coercion.<\/p>\n

\n

No trust without verification. No trade without safeguards. No energy without diversification. No diplomacy without deterrence. No deterrence without an exit strategy.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is the difference between na\u00efve normalisation and managed coexistence. Europe does not need to return to a system in which it becomes dependent on one supplier, one security guarantor or one political illusion. But it also does not need to construct a future in which every border becomes a permanent military frontier and every economic relationship is treated as a security threat.<\/p>\n

A stable Europe will require both resilience and channels. Resilience without channels creates isolation. Channels without resilience create dependency. The future order must contain both.<\/p>\n

Ukraine cannot be an object<\/h2>\n

One of the greatest risks in any discussion about peace is that Ukraine becomes an object discussed by others rather than a political actor with its own interests, fears and rights.<\/p>\n

Ukraine has paid the highest direct cost of the war. Its population has endured destruction, displacement, loss, military mobilisation, political pressure and economic strain. Any credible settlement must therefore recognise that Ukraine cannot simply be asked to absorb permanent insecurity in exchange for a temporary reduction in violence.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Europe must be honest about the structural problem. A war that becomes indefinitely financed, indefinitely armed and indefinitely unresolved will gradually weaken the coalition that supports Ukraine. This is not because Europeans are indifferent to Ukraine. It is because societies eventually ask what the political destination of their sacrifice is. Support without strategy becomes fatigue.<\/p>\n

A serious European approach must therefore combine continued support with a visible framework for eventual settlement. That framework cannot guarantee immediate agreement. It cannot erase territorial disputes or historical trauma. But it can create a path away from permanent war.<\/p>\n

\n

Credible Ukrainian security. Verification and monitoring mechanisms. Clear consequences for violations. Limits on destabilising military deployments. Arms-control arrangements. Structured diplomatic channels. Phased economic incentives for compliance. Long-term reconstruction tied to governance and stability.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

None of this means that a settlement would be easy. It means that Europe must stop pretending that the only alternative to surrender is endless confrontation. There is another possibility: a hard peace.<\/p>\n

A hard peace is not sentimental. It does not assume goodwill. It does not depend on slogans or on the expectation that historical grievances will simply disappear. It relies on interests, costs, verification and mutual constraints. It accepts that the parties may remain rivals and that trust may remain low. But it creates a system in which returning to war becomes more expensive, less predictable and less attractive than maintaining an imperfect peace. That is a more realistic ambition than expecting friendship.<\/p>\n

The cost of a permanent eastern front<\/h2>\n

The war in the east is not only a military problem. It is also a fiscal, industrial and political problem.<\/p>\n

Europe is already under pressure from ageing populations, pension obligations, healthcare costs, weak productivity growth, infrastructure needs, energy-transition spending and rising competition from the United States, China and other industrial powers. Adding a permanent high-intensity security burden to this system has consequences. More defence spending may be necessary. But every euro spent on ammunition, military infrastructure and deterrence is a euro that cannot automatically be spent on grids, housing, education, industrial renewal, automation, medical capacity or social cohesion.<\/p>\n

This does not mean Europe should choose welfare over security. It means Europe must understand that security itself depends on economic capacity.<\/p>\n

\n

Industrial weakness \u2192 weaker tax base \u2192 lower fiscal room \u2192 social conflict \u2192 political fragmentation \u2192 weaker defence sustainability \u2192 weaker deterrence.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

A weak, indebted, deindustrialising and politically fragmented Europe will not become secure simply because it buys more weapons. The same applies to energy. Europe cannot build a lasting security order while paying permanently elevated energy costs, relying on fragile maritime routes and forcing energy-intensive industry into structural decline. Energy policy cannot be separated from defence policy, because industrial capacity, grid reliability, chemical production, logistics, steel, engineering and manufacturing are all part of real strategic power.<\/p>\n

A country that loses its industrial base cannot compensate indefinitely through financial transfers and military rhetoric. Europe therefore needs to think of security in broader terms. Security is not only soldiers, tanks and air defence. Security is affordable energy, functioning industry, reliable infrastructure, public trust, demographic capacity and a society that believes its sacrifices lead somewhere.<\/p>\n

That is why the search for a peace architecture is not a distraction from European security. It is part of European security.<\/p>\n

Deterrence must serve a political destination<\/h2>\n

The central mistake would be to treat deterrence as an end in itself.<\/p>\n

Deterrence is necessary because it raises the cost of coercion. It gives diplomats time. It protects weaker states from being forced into immediate concessions. It signals that force will not be rewarded easily. But deterrence only works politically if it is connected to a destination.<\/p>\n

Without a destination, military preparation can become self-reinforcing. Every side sees the other side\u2019s preparations as proof of hostile intent. Every exercise becomes a warning. Every new deployment creates a counter-deployment. Every defensive measure is interpreted through the fear that it may become offensive. The result is not always war. But it is a continent living permanently close to war.<\/p>\n

\n

Deterrence + verification + arms control + diplomatic channels + economic resilience + political patience = managed security without permanent escalation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This would require a future European security process larger than the immediate battlefield. It would need to involve Ukraine, Russia, European states, the United States, T\u00fcrkiye and other relevant actors. It would need to address conventional force posture, missile systems, drone warfare, military exercises, cyber operations, maritime security, nuclear risk reduction and economic relations.<\/p>\n

That may sound ambitious. But the alternative is not simplicity. The alternative is a Europe that accepts an unresolved conflict as a permanent organising principle while hoping that its economic and political system can carry the cost indefinitely. That is not realism. It is postponement.<\/p>\n

The peace Europe needs<\/h2>\n

Europe does not need a peace built on illusions. It does not need a return to the world in which commercial ties were assumed to guarantee political stability. It does not need a settlement that abandons Ukraine. And it does not need a security order based on permanent humiliation of Russia, because humiliation is rarely stable and often becomes a source of future revisionism.<\/p>\n

\n

Ukraine remains politically viable and defensible. Russia is contained where necessary, but not treated as a permanent void beyond diplomacy. Europe diversifies energy without turning energy into an endless geopolitical punishment system. Military strength exists, but is tied to de-escalation mechanisms. Sanctions remain a tool, not a permanent substitute for strategy. Economic links return only where they reduce risk, not where they rebuild dependency. Borders are protected, but not transformed into permanent theatres of mobilisation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

This is not a call for softness. It is a call for a European strategy that understands the difference between strength and rigidity. Strength gives a society options. Rigidity reduces them. Europe\u2019s future will depend on whether it can preserve the first without falling into the second.<\/p>\n

The unfinished question<\/h2>\n

The unfinished war in the east is not only the war on the battlefield. It is also the unresolved question of what kind of continent Europe wants to become.<\/p>\n

Will it become a permanently armed borderland between rival power systems? Will it accept a future of higher costs, lower growth, external dependency and recurring political panic? Or will it use the present crisis to build a more resilient, more independent and more politically mature security order?<\/p>\n

The answer cannot be found in one negotiation, one summit or one ceasefire. It will require patience, deterrence, institutional discipline and political courage.<\/p>\n

\n

Europe needs the strength to prevent war today \u2014 and the imagination not to prepare for the same war forever.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Why Europe needs deterrence for Ukraine and Eastern Europe \u2014 but also a hard-peace architecture and an exit from permanent confrontation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1107,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"single-gridizer-research-system.php","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_ggc_chapter_title":"","_ggc_series_title":"","_ggc_chapter_number":3,"_ggc_chapter_order":3},"categories":[146],"tags":[],"ggc_research_series":[156],"class_list":["post-1104","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-gridizer-research-en","ggc_research_series-europe-under-pressure"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Unfinished War in the East -<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"de_DE\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Unfinished War in the East -\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Why Europe needs deterrence for Ukraine and Eastern Europe \u2014 but also a hard-peace architecture and an exit from permanent confrontation.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1024\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"640\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Verfasst von\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Gesch\u00e4tzte Lesezeit\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"11\u00a0Minuten\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/804da6417582f6bbf202875e4d08974e\"},\"headline\":\"The Unfinished War in the East\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":2030,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Gridizer Research\"],\"inLanguage\":\"de\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/\",\"name\":\"The Unfinished War in the East -\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"de\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"de\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":640,\"caption\":\"The Unfinished War in the East\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Start\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Unfinished War in the East\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/\",\"name\":\"Gridizer Research Intelligence\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"de\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Gridizer Research Intelligence\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"de\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/GridizerWorldInDotsLogoWidth280.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/06\\\/GridizerWorldInDotsLogoWidth280.png\",\"width\":280,\"height\":65,\"caption\":\"Gridizer Research Intelligence\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/804da6417582f6bbf202875e4d08974e\",\"name\":\"admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"de\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/gridizer.com\\\/research\\\/author\\\/grid_iiz4ez6u\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Unfinished War in the East -","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/","og_locale":"de_DE","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Unfinished War in the East -","og_description":"Why Europe needs deterrence for Ukraine and Eastern Europe \u2014 but also a hard-peace architecture and an exit from permanent confrontation.","og_url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/","article_published_time":"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1024,"height":640,"url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Verfasst von":"admin","Gesch\u00e4tzte Lesezeit":"11\u00a0Minuten"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/"},"author":{"name":"admin","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#\/schema\/person\/804da6417582f6bbf202875e4d08974e"},"headline":"The Unfinished War in the East","datePublished":"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/"},"wordCount":2030,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg","articleSection":["Gridizer Research"],"inLanguage":"de"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/","url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/","name":"The Unfinished War in the East -","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg","datePublished":"2026-06-28T07:05:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-06-28T07:05:03+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"de","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"de","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/featured_image_chapter3.jpg","width":1024,"height":640,"caption":"The Unfinished War in the East"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/the-unfinished-war-in-the-east\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Start","item":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Unfinished War in the East"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#website","url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/","name":"Gridizer Research Intelligence","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"de"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#organization","name":"Gridizer Research Intelligence","url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"de","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/GridizerWorldInDotsLogoWidth280.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/GridizerWorldInDotsLogoWidth280.png","width":280,"height":65,"caption":"Gridizer Research Intelligence"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/#\/schema\/person\/804da6417582f6bbf202875e4d08974e","name":"admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"de","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8370c8341de45cb4abb22ed564bf3fd17faa99d8117fa50c3d407dcdddb45050?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research"],"url":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/author\/grid_iiz4ez6u\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1104","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1104"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1104\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1120,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1104\/revisions\/1120"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1107"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1104"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1104"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1104"},{"taxonomy":"ggc_research_series","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gridizer.com\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ggc_research_series?post=1104"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}